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Analogies may arise from the conscious detection of similarities between a present and
a past situation. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we tested whether
young volunteers would detect analogies unconsciously between a current supraliminal
(visible) and a past subliminal (invisible) situation. The subliminal encoding of the past situ-
ation precludes awareness of analogy detection in the current situation. First, participants
encoded subliminal pairs of unrelated words in either one or nine encoding trials. Later,
they judged the semantic fit of supraliminally presented new words that either retained a
previously encoded semantic relation (“analog”) or not (“broken analog”).Words in analogs
versus broken analogs were judged closer semantically, which indicates unconscious anal-
ogy detection. Hippocampal activity associated with subliminal encoding correlated with
the behavioral measure of unconscious analogy detection. Analogs versus broken analogs
were processed with reduced prefrontal but enhanced medial temporal activity. We con-
clude that analogous episodes can be detected even unconsciously drawing on the episodic
memory network.
Keywords: episodic memory, subliminal, analogical mapping, consciousness, flexibility, hippocampus, medial
temporal lobe
INTRODUCTION
We pull up analogies to make inventions, solve problems, and
plan and adapt our behavior in new situations. The detection of
analogies assumes a source situation that is remembered and a
present situation that is interpreted in light of the source situation
(Gentner, 1983). For example, bodily and facial cues of a young
couple flirting might suddenly remind us of an episode at a sci-
entific session where two scientists eager for collaboration made
their first contact. Analogies arise from the detection of corre-
spondences or mappings between elements in a current situation
and elements in a memory representation of a past situation. The
detection of situational analogies depends on a flexible expression
of source memories because the format and elements of the source
situation often differ from the format and elements of a current
situation. Flexibility of memory expression is considered a hall-
mark of episodic memory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Frank
et al., 2003; Henke, 2010).
Analogies often spring to mind suddenly and unexpectedly.
The detection of analogies likely transcends an unconscious stage
before entering consciousness. The source knowledge is usually
stored in either episodic (Gentner et al., 1993; Schunn and Dunbar,
1996; Wharton et al., 1996; Day and Goldstone, 2011) or semantic
memory (Spellman et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2005; Green et al.,
2006a,b, 2010) with both forms of memory hypothesized to be
associated with consciousness of encoding/retrieval (Squire and
Zola, 1996; Moscovitch, 2008). Episodic memory depends on hip-
pocampal processing (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Reber and
Squire, 1994; Squire and Zola, 1996; Squire et al., 2007; Moscovitch,
2008) and hippocampal activity closely tracks conscious experi-
ence (Kreiman et al., 2002; Quiroga et al., 2008). A prominent role
in analogical mapping has been assigned to the prefrontal cortex
(Morrison et al., 2004; Bunge et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006b,
2010; Speed, 2010; Knowlton et al., 2012), which has also been
linked to consciousness of information processing (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Hence, the detec-
tion of analogies in a current situation may require the conscious
retrieval of a source situation.
We hypothesize that the detection of analogies between a source
and a current situation does not strictly require conscious aware-
ness of encoding/retrieving. On the contrary, we assume that
analogical mapping proceeds automatically and unconsciously as
a consequence of a facilitated processing of relations between ele-
ments in a current situation based on the past experience of similar
relations (Schunn and Dunbar, 1996; Leech et al., 2008). Then,
unconscious analogical mapping may or may not emerge to con-
sciousness. Evidence for unconscious analogical mapping comes
from purely behavioral studies that assessed awareness of analogi-
cal mapping with post hoc self-reports (Schunn and Dunbar, 1996;
Silberman et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006a; Day and Gentner, 2007;
Day and Goldstone, 2011). A more stringent way to test for uncon-
scious analogical mapping is by presenting the source situation
subliminally (invisibly) for unconscious encoding. Using sublim-
inal presentations and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), we gained evidence that unconscious analogy detection
is feasible by the way of episodic memory network including
hippocampus.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
OVERVIEW
For subliminal encoding, we presented pairs of unrelated words
(e.g., table–car) to establish novel unconscious source knowl-
edge (Figure 1). Participants performed an attention task during
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FIGURE 1 | Subliminal and supraliminal trials. Left side, subliminal word
pairs were presented for 17 ms between pattern masks. Participants were not
informed of subliminal stimuli; they performed an attention task during the
subliminal stimulation sequence. There was a break of 5 min between
encoding and test. Right side, at test, pairs of new words were presented
supraliminal in three conditions for participants to decide whether words in a
pair fit together semantically. Words in analogs were new but retained
semantic relations from subliminal encoding word pairs (encoding: table–car;
test: desk–bus). Semantic relations were broken in Broken Analogs. Control
pairs consisted of words that were neither semantically close to encoding
words nor retained semantic relations. Successive stimuli are depicted from
bottom left to top right.
subliminal encoding to ensure that their attentional focus
remained on the stimulus display. After 5 min of quiet rest, we
presented word pairs for conscious inspection that consisted of
new (not subliminally presented) words that were conceptually
related to the subliminal encoding words (Figure 1). The concep-
tual relations that were established during unconscious encoding
were either kept intact at test (analogs) or not (broken analogs)
(Silberman et al., 2005; Reber and Henke, 2011). Thus, an analo-
gous word pair (e.g., desk–bus) maintained the conceptual relation
(e.g., a piece of furniture–a means of transport) that was estab-
lished during an encoding trial (e.g., table–car). Broken analogs
combined words (e.g., counter–banana) that were conceptually
related to words from two different encoding trials (e.g., table–car;
keyboard–apple). The participants’ task was to judge whether the
two words in a pair fit together semantically or not (forced-choice
test). More fit responses to analogs than broken analogs suggest
that novel source knowledge was established and that the mapping
of source knowledge onto the target was successful. Crucially, the
participants were unaware of any memory reactivation because
encoding stimuli were subliminal. Subliminal encoding precluded
participants’ awareness of analogical relations between encoding
and test words. We varied the number of encoding trials between
participants to measure potential effects of subliminal overlearn-
ing such as semanticization (disengagement of hippocampus over
encoding trials) and unitized versus compositional representation
of encoding word pairs. To this aim, half of participants (N = 30)
encoded each subliminal word pair in one subliminal encoding
trial, while the other half of participants encoded each subliminal
word pair in nine subliminal encoding trials (Figure 2D).
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 60 right-handed men with a mean age of
24.6 years [standard deviation (SD)= 4.6 years]. They reported
no current or past neurological or psychiatric illness, were native
German speakers, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
The analysis of the behavioral data included the datasets of
57 participants. Three participants were excluded because their
performance on the attention task (given during subliminal stim-
ulation) was below two SDs of the group mean. SDs were derived
separately for the participants in the one-trial encoding condi-
tion and participants in the nine-trial encoding condition because
mean hit rates on the attention task differed between encoding
conditions (see Results).
Performance on the attention task correlated inversely with the
quality of encoding subliminal word pairs (see Results). Hence,
performance on the attention task could be taken as proxy for
subliminal encoding quality. In order to isolate the good from the
poor subliminal encoders, we performed a median split on the z-
values of the attention task. In the following, we refer to low versus
high performers on the attention task as good versus poor sublim-
inal encoders, respectively. Because half of participants encoded
word pairs in one and half in the nine subliminal encoding tri-
als, the median split resulted in four subgroups of participants:
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 9 | 2
Reber et al. Detecting analogies unconsciously
FIGURE 2 | Experimental design. (A–C) The colored boxes illustrate trial
blocks that belong to a certain experimental condition. Lines within
colored boxes stand for individual trials. The sequence of blocks over
time is given from bottom left to top right. (A) The fMRI time-series for
subliminal one-trial encoding entailed four blocks of four subliminal word
pairs each and four blocks of four pairs of consonant strings each. Blocks
of word pairs (blue) alternated with blocks of pairs of consonant strings
(gray). (B) In the fMRI time-series for subliminal nine-trial encoding, the
four blocks with word pairs were repeated nine times for a better
encoding. Blocks with pairs of consonant strings were not repeated.
These blocks were interspersed at pseudo-random positions in the
time-series. (C) The test fMRI time-series embraced four conditions of
four blocks each. Each block contained four trials. Condition blocks were
presented in a fixed alternating sequence. (D) Half of participants were
assigned to the one-trial encoding group and the other half to the
nine-trial encoding group. Both groups took two experimental runs. Each
run consisted of an encoding part, a 5-min encoding-test interval, and a
test part.
of 29 poor subliminal encoders, 15 were in the one-trial encoding
condition and 14 in the nine-trial encoding condition; of 28 good
subliminal encoders, 13 were in the one-trial encoding condition
and 15 in the nine-trial encoding condition.
The analysis of functional imaging data included 51 partic-
ipants as the data of nine participants were excluded because
of the excessive scan-to-scan movements (N = 1), slice-artifacts
(N = 5), and – as mentioned above – very low performance on
the attention task (N = 3). Of the 51 evaluated fMRI datasets,
27 corresponded to poor subliminal encoders, of whom 14
belonged to the one-trial encoding condition and 13 to the
nine-trial encoding condition. Twenty-four datasets corresponded
to good subliminal encoders, of whom 12 were in the one-
trial encoding condition and 12 in the nine-trial encoding
condition.
APPARATUS
The experiment took place in a magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) chamber that was darkened by turning off all lights and by a
black curtain that prevented light from entering the MRI chamber.
A BenQ SP831 DLP projector was placed in between the curtain
and the shielding glass to project the stimulus sequence onto a
screen positioned in front of the MR scanner. Stimuli spanned a
visual field of 11°(height)× 13 (width). They were back-projected
onto the screen. Participants viewed the stimuli through two mir-
rors mounted on the head-coil. The stimulus sequence was gen-
erated by a laptop running the software Presentation1. The visual
1http://www.neurobs.com/presentation
display had a resolution of 1024× 768 pixel and was presented
with a refresh rate of 60 Hz.
SUBLIMINAL PRESENTATION PROTOCOL
One subliminal encoding trial entailed 12 presentations of a
word pair (W) within a 6-s time-window (Degonda et al., 2005)
(Figure 1). Each of the 12 presentations lasted 17 ms and was pre-
ceded and followed by random-dot pattern masks (M; masking
stimuli) that were presented for 183 ms each. Preceding two such
masked presentations of a word pair (M W M M W M), either a
fixation cross, a horizontal, or a vertical bar (A) was presented for
233 ms. This presentation sequence (A M W M M W M) lasted
1 s and was repeated six times with the same word pair as sub-
liminal stimulus. The fixation cross was presented randomly five
in six times; a horizontal or vertical bar was presented with equal
probability once in six times. The participants’ task was to focus
gaze on the fixation cross/bar and to indicate the orientation of a
bar by button press immediately upon the bar’s occurrence.
PRACTICE RUN
The practice run allowed for the conscious inspection of both
encoding and test word pairs. We wanted participants to note
the correspondence between encoding and test word pairs, which
should allow them to install a task-set for the ensuing subliminal
trials. Task-sets may guide the processing of subliminal stimuli
(Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Reber and Henke, 2011). The encoding
part of the practice run took 2.4 min. It was followed by 5 min of
rest. The practice run ended with the test part, which took 4.8 min.
Encoding and test word pairs were presented once for 3.5 s with
inter-stimulus intervals of 1 s. Participants engaged in the same
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forced-choice task during encoding and test. The forced-choice
task required them to decide whether the two words in an encod-
ing or test pair fit together semantically or not. Since words in
all pairs were semantically distant, we asked participants to relax
their response criterion in order to give an approximately equal
amount of fit and don’t fit responses. When pairs of consonant
strings (baseline) were presented, participants were asked to judge
the visual fit between two consonant strings as if they were two art
sculptures. This instruction was chosen to foster a holistic process-
ing of consonant strings, which makes the processing comparable
to the equally holistic processing of words in pairs.
After the completion of this supraliminal practice run, par-
ticipants were interviewed on whether they had noticed the cor-
respondence between encoding word pairs and analogs. If they
could name at least one encoding word pair and its analog (e.g.,
table–car; desk–bus), they were classified as having gained insight
into the task structure. In a previous study (Reber and Henke,
2011),participants with versus without insight performed better in
the following subliminal encoding and retrieval task. This finding
was not replicated in the present study. Twenty-eight participants
gained insight into the task structure during the practice run. The
difference in the baseline-corrected percentage of fit responses
given to analogs versus broken analogs in the main experiment did
not differ between participants, who gained insight (M = 2.4%,
SD= 1.2%, N = 28), and participants, who failed to gain insight
(M = 0.5%, SD= 1.1%, N = 29), t (55)= 0.625, p= 0.534.
MAIN EXPERIMENT
The main experiment consisted of two experimental runs. Each
experimental run started with the encoding part, included a 5-
min break and ended with the test part. Unlike the practice run,
encoding word pairs were presented subliminally for unconscious
encoding (Figure 1). The task at test was again a forced-choice
judgment of the semantic fit between the two supraliminal words
in a test pair, as in the practice run.
For half of the participants, encoding word pairs were presented
in one subliminal encoding trial (one-trial encoding) during both
experimental runs. Encoding and test word pairs were presented in
blocks of four with four blocks per condition (Figure 2A). Blocks
of encoding word pairs alternated with blocks of pairs of conso-
nant strings (baseline). Half of the encoding time-series started
with a block of word pairs and half with a block of pairs of con-
sonant strings. There was a 5-min break between the encoding
and test fMRI time-series. In the test fMRI time-series, the order
of condition blocks (conditions: analogs, broken analogs, control
word pairs, and pairs of consonant strings) was varied between
participants according to a Latin-square (Figure 2C). The fMRI
time-series on subliminal one-trial encoding took 3.2 min and the
test fMRI time-series took 4.8 min.
For the other half of participants, each encoding word pair
was presented in nine temporally dispersed encoding trials (nine-
trial encoding) in both experimental runs (Figure 2B). To alleviate
tiring,nine-trial encoding was split into three encoding fMRI time-
series per experimental run, separated by 1 min breaks, during
which time no fMRI data were acquired. The ninefold repetition
concerned only word pairs presented in the experimental condi-
tion but not the pairs of consonant strings presented in the baseline
condition – these were shown only once. The four condition blocks
that contained pairs of consonant strings were pseudo-randomly
intermixed with the condition blocks that contained word pairs.
Before any block of word pairs was repeated,we presented the com-
plete set of encoding word pairs. At test, the order of condition
blocks (conditions: analogs, broken analogs, control word pairs,
and pairs of consonant strings) was varied between participants
according to a Latin-square (Figure 2C). The three fMRI time-
series on subliminal encoding over nine-trials lasted 16 min in total
(5.3 min per times-series; no scanning during the 1-min breaks
between time-series). The test fMRI time-series took 4.8 min.
AWARENESS TEST
After the main experiment, participants were asked whether
they had noticed words or perceptual fragments thereof during
subliminal encoding. Then, participants were informed of the
masked presentation of subliminal stimuli. Finally, we conducted
an awareness test to measure participants’ ability to discriminate
masked words. This awareness test consisted of 30 encoding-test
trials. On each trial, a word was presented in one subliminal encod-
ing trial with the masking technique of the main experiment.
Immediately following the subliminal presentation of a word, we
presented two supraliminal words side-by-side for participants
to do a forced-choice task. Participants chose which word was
semantically related to the preceding subliminal word. The target
word was semantically related to the subliminal word and the dis-
tracter word was unrelated. The side of the target/distracter was
randomized.
STIMULI
We assembled 192 triplets of words that consisted of subordinates
to the same concept (e.g., table–desk–counter; car–bus–truck;
apple–pear–banana). These triplets were assigned to six lists each
containing 32 triplets. Two lists were assigned to the practice run,
two lists to the first experimental run, and two lists to the sec-
ond experimental run. For each run, one list was used to create
encoding word pairs, analogs, and broken analogs. The other list
was used to create the control word pairs presented at test only.
Encoding word pairs were formed by combining the first words
of two different triplets (e.g., table–car). Analogs were formed
by combining the second words of these triplets (e.g., desk–bus)
and broken analogs by combining the third words of two triplets
(e.g., counter–banana). Control word pairs were constructed by
combining the first, the second, or the third words in two triplets.
Furthermore, pairs of randomly generated consonant strings (e.g.,
cvmgwpls–pklwqvcn; eight different consonants per string) were
presented in the encoding and test time-series as a baseline con-
dition. A stimulus list entailed 16 pairs of words or consonant
strings (conditions of the encoding fMRI time-series: encoding
word pairs, pairs of consonant strings; conditions of the retrieval
fMRI time-series: analogs, broken analogs, control word pairs, and
pairs of consonant strings).
To counterbalance word pairs between the analogs and broken
analogs condition, encoding word pairs were re-arranged (e.g.,
original list: table–car; counterbalanced list: table–apple). The
resulting analogs (counter–pear) and broken analogs (desk–bus)
were thus identical to broken analogs and analogs, respectively, in
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the initial arrangement. The assignment of the six lists of triplets
to conditions and experimental runs was balanced between partic-
ipants. A further list of stimuli was used for the test of awareness,
which was conducted after the main experiment. For the test of
awareness, we compiled 60 pairs of conceptually related words.
Two pairs (four words) were assigned to one-trial in the awareness
test. The word used for subliminal presentation was randomly
chosen from the four words. The semantically related word was
the target and the distracter word was randomly chosen from the
two remaining words.
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
The experiment was conducted on a 1.5-T Philips whole-
body MRI scanner. We used an eight-channel head coil.
fMRI data were obtained with a sensitivity-encoded single-
shot echo planar imaging sequence with an acceleration fac-
tor r = 2.0 (Schmidt et al., 2005). Thirty-four slices along
the AC–PC line were acquired without inter-slice gaps. The
time of repetition (TR) was 3 s, echo-time (TE) 50 ms, flip-
angle θ= 90°. The field of view was 22 cm× 22 cm. The mea-
sured voxel-size was 2.75 mm× 2.75 mm× 4 mm, which was
reconstructed to a voxel-size of 1.72 mm× 1.72 mm× 4 mm. A
standard 3D T1 image was acquired as anatomical reference
(TE= 3.8 ms, TR= 8.2 ms, flip-angle θ= 8°, 160 slices, origi-
nal voxel-size= 1 mm× 1 mm× 1 mm, no interpolation, field of
view= 24 cm× 24 cm, no inter-slice gaps).
ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING DATA
The fMRI data were analyzed using the statistical parametric map-
ping toolbox2 (SPM 8). Preprocessing included spatial realign-
ment of the EPI images, normalization of EPI images to a standard
anatomical space (mean image of 152 subjects from the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute), and spatial smoothing with an 8-mm
Gaussian kernel.
fMRI scanning was halted during the breaks between encoding
and test.
First-level models were estimated separately for encoding and
test. These models included regressors that were created by con-
volving a canonical hemodynamic response function with box-car
functions of the on- and off-sets of the experimental conditions,
and six movement-regressors that were estimated during spa-
tial realignment. First-level contrast images of interest (e.g., pairs
of words> pairs of consonant strings) were subjected to ran-
dom effects analyses. Random effects analyses were thresholded at
p= 0.001 (uncorrected), and the minimum cluster extent was set
to 20 consecutive voxels. We adopted a looser statistical threshold
(p= 0.005, no cluster extent) for the medial and anterior temporal
lobe because these regions are of particular interest in the current
study.
We needed to compute separate models for one-trial and
nine-trial encoding because the encoding time-series differed
(Figure 2). Hence, we computed separate second-level analyses
for one-trial and nine-trial encoding. Based on the behavioral
data, we split participants into good and poor subliminal encoders.
2http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
The second-level analyses therefore included the between-subjects
factor Encoding Quality (good versus poor subliminal encoders).
The contrast of one-trial encoding was pairs of words> pairs
of consonant strings including the data of the good subliminal
encoders (N = 12). The contrast of nine-trial encoding contained
beta-weights of the linear increase of the BOLD signal over the
nine repetitions of subliminal word pairs including the data of the
good subliminal encoders (N = 12). To investigate neural activity
obtained at test, we computed an ANOVA with the within-subjects
factor Test Condition (analogs, broken analogs) and the between-
subjects factors Learning Intensity (one-trial encoding, nine-trial
encoding) and Encoding Quality (good subliminal encoders, poor
subliminal encoders). The dependent measure consisted of the
first-level contrast images analogs> control word pairs and bro-
ken analogs> control word pairs. The reported analysis is a t -test
of analogs versus broken analogs of this ANOVA for the good
subliminal encoders. This contrast collapsed data over Learning
Intensity because Learning Intensity did not influence behavioral
results (N = 24).
To investigate brain–behavior correlations, we performed one-
sample t -tests of contrasts of interest (e.g., analogs> broken
analogs) including the behavioral measure obtained at test as a
covariate of interest.
ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL DATA
Reaction times (RTs) of semantic fit responses given at test were
z-transformed per participant. Trials with z-values below or above
M ± 2 SD were excluded from analysis. Data were aggregated
per condition (mean of RTs; sum of fit/don’t fit responses). We
arrived at the percentage of fit responses by dividing the num-
ber of fit responses given in a certain condition (e.g., analogs,
broken analogs, control word pairs) by the sum of fit and don’t fit
responses given in that condition. To control for a subjects’ generic
propensity to give fit responses, the percentage of fit responses to
control word pairs was subtracted from both the percentage of
fit responses given to analogs and the percentage of fit responses
given to broken analogs. We refer to the resulting numbers as
baseline-corrected percentages of fit responses (Figure 3).
RESULTS
GOOD PERFORMANCE ON THE ATTENTION TASK
Because nine-trial encoding took longer and was more tiring than
one-trial encoding, the rate of correct responses on the attention
task was lower in the nine-trial (M = 80%, SD= 2%,N = 29) than
the one-trial encoding condition (M = 96%, SD= 3%, N = 28)
[t (55)= 21.066, p< 10−27]. Still, the rates of correct responses
were high enough in both conditions to assume that participants
kept attention up throughout the experiment.
DETECTION OF ANALOGIES TO UNCONSCIOUS MEMORIES
We had hypothesized that the unconscious detection of analogies
would yield more fit responses to analogs than broken analogs
(Reber and Henke, 2011). Surprisingly, no such effect was appar-
ent for the whole sample (N = 57). However, performance on the
attention task during subliminal encoding predicted whether par-
ticipants could detect analogies and yielded a larger number of
fit responses to analogs versus broken analogs. A poorer perfor-
mance on the attention task predicted more fit responses to analogs
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FIGURE 3 | Behavioral results. The left-hand chart shows the percentages
of fit responses given to analogs and broken analogs by the group of good
and the group of poor subliminal encoders. These percentage values are
baseline-corrected; i.e., the percentage of fit responses given to control
word pairs was subtracted. Error bars indicate standard errors of means.
The difference in the percentage of fit responses to analogs versus broken
analogs reached significance at the 5% level in good subliminal encoders.
The right-hand chart shows the scatter plot of the correlation between
performance on the attention task (during subliminal encoding) and
unconscious analogy detection at test (difference in the percentage of fit
responses to analogs versus broken analogs). A poorer performance on the
attention task predicted a better performance at detecting analogies
(R=−0.332, p=0.012).
than broken analogs in the whole sample (R=−0.332, p= 0.012,
N = 57, Figure 3). It thus appears that focusing too much on
the attention task took away from the simultaneous processing
of subliminal word pairs. We divided our sample by median split
into low versus high performers on the attention task or good
versus poor subliminal encoders, respectively. Good subliminal
encoders gave more fit responses to analogs (baseline-corrected;
M = 4.2%, SD= 13.5%; Figure 3) than to broken analogs
(M =−0.6%, SD= 16.3%), t (27)= 2.432, p= 0.022 (Figure 3).
No such difference was found for poor subliminal encoders
[M analogs=−2.6%, SDanalogs= 14.5%, Mbroken analogs=−0.8%,
SDbroken analogs= 12.6%, t (28)=−0.858, p= 0.398; Figure 3].
The number of encoding trials did not influence performance
at test. The number of fit responses given to analogs versus bro-
ken analogs was statistically equal between the one-trial and the
nine-trial encoding condition: (a) across the whole group of par-
ticipants [t (55)=−0.311, p= 0.757], (b) within the group good
subliminal encoders [t (26)=−0.907, p= 0.373], and (c) within
the group of poor subliminal encoders [t (27)= 0.549, p= 0.588].
This and previous findings (Reber and Henke, 2011) bolster the
view that young and healthy participants encode subliminal word
pairs equally well in one and nine trials.
PARTICIPANTS WERE UNAWARE OF SUBLIMINAL STIMULI
Interviews conducted after the main experiment revealed that
no participant had noticed words or perceptual fragments
thereof during subliminal encoding. The test of awareness indi-
cated that participants were unable to discern the sublimi-
nal stimuli when directly instructed to do so. The mean fre-
quency of correct responses (M = 14.98, SD= 2.35) did not
differ from the chance performance (15 correct responses);
t (56)=−0.056, p= 0.955. Neither was there a significant dif-
ference in the number of correct responses between the partic-
ipants in the nine-trial versus the one-trial encoding condition
[M 9 trial= 15.45, SD9 trial= 2.84, M 1 trial= 14.50, SD1 trial= 1.62;
t (55)=−1.542, p= 0.129] nor between good versus poor sub-
liminal encoders [M good encoders= 15.05, SDgood encoders= 2.40,
Mpoor encoders= 14.93, SDpoor encoders= 2.34; t (55)= 0.167,
p= 0.868].
UNCONSCIOUS ENCODING OF WORD PAIRS RECRUITS REGIONS OF
THE EPISODIC MEMORY NETWORK
Based on previous findings (Henke et al., 2003a,b; Degonda et al.,
2005; Reber et al., 2012), we hypothesized that structures of the
episodic memory network including the hippocampus would sup-
port one-trial encoding of subliminal word pairs. To address this
hypothesis, we tested for increases of brain activity during blocks
of subliminal word pairs versus blocks of subliminal pairs of con-
sonant strings presented in runs with one encoding trial. We are
reporting fMRI results for the good subliminal encoders because
only the group of good subliminal encoders showed a successful
unconscious detection of analogies as indicated by a larger number
of fit responses given to analogs than to broken analogs (Figure 3).
Significant activity increases were located in two regions within the
left hippocampus (Table 1). A further cluster of increased activity
emerged in the precuneus (BA 7), a region that has been impli-
cated in the mnemonic processing of items with rich contextual
details (Gilboa et al., 2004; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). Further
activity increases were located in the posterior cingulate gyrus (BA
31), a constituent of the episodic memory network (Cabeza and
Nyberg, 2000), and in the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 46), which has
been implicated in the encoding of the relationships between two
elements in an associative stimulus (Blumenfeld and Ranganath,
2006; Murray and Ranganath, 2007). Further activity increases
targeted BA 6 including the medial frontal gyrus and the precen-
tral gyrus; both regions are thought to support a fluent semantic
retrieval (Chee et al., 1999; Binder et al., 2009; Graves et al., 2010;
Segaert et al., 2012).
The analyses of nine-trial subliminal encoding corroborate
that structures of the episodic memory network subserved the
encoding of subliminal word pairs. We assessed effects of a regres-
sor that increased linearly with each repetition of a subliminal
word pair (Table 2). Good subliminal encoders displayed signal
increases over repetitions in the left anterior hippocampus and the
right hippocampus extending into right rhinal cortex. Although
stimulus repetitions have been reported to be associated with
decreasing activity (repetition suppression) in the medial tem-
poral lobe (Turk-Browne et al., 2006; Vannini et al., 2012; Manelis
et al., 2013), others report repetition enhancement (Kirwan et al.,
2009; Greene and Soto, 2012). A likely reason for the current rep-
etition enhancement is the brief presentation time (17 ms), which
is associated with a weak signal. But this weak signal may gain
in strength over repetitions, an effect found in a previous study
(Müller et al., 2013). A progressively deeper semantic analysis
of word pairs was suggested by a linear increase of activity in
lateral temporal cortex and prefrontal cortex. Temporal repeti-
tion enhancement was located in the bilateral temporal poles and
left inferior temporal gyrus suggesting that words were analyzed
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Table 1 | Onefold encoding of subliminal word pairs.
Brain region BA Left/right MNI-coordinates k t z
x y z
WORD PAIRS > CONSONANT STRINGS
Inferior frontal gyrus 46 R 40 34 8 21 4.17 3.56
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L/R 0 −10 70 121 4.77 3.94
Precentral gyrus 6 L −60 −12 40 21 4.62 3.85
Hippocampus L −38 −22 −12 55 4.22 3.59
Hippocampus L −32 −40 0 59 4.42 3.72
Posterior cingulate gyrus 31 L −10 −44 46 33 4.93 4.03
Precuneus 7 R 8 −60 44 49 5.03 4.09
CONSONANT STRINGS >WORD PAIRS
Lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus 18 L −22 −78 −6 38 5.00 4.07
N=12 (good subliminal encoders); statistical maps thresholded at p=0.005, k=0 in medial and anterior temporal lobe regions, all other regions p=0.001, k=20.
Table 2 | Ninefold encoding of subliminal word pairs.
Brain region BA Left/right MNI-coordinates k t z
x y z
LINEAR INCREASE OF BOLD SIGNAL WITH STIMULUS REPETITIONS
Temporal pole 38 R 38 22 −38 80 5.91 4.53
Temporal pole 38 L −36 18 −40 37 4.73 3.89
Superior frontal gyrus 6 L −12 16 68 24 4.41 3.7
Inferior temporal gyrus 20 L −52 −4 −36 57 6.19 4.66
Putamen R 26 −12 4 29 4.58 3.8
Hippocampus L −28 −14 −24 69 4.36 3.66
Hippocampus, rhinal cortex 35 R 26 −22 −18 27 4.42 3.7
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L/R 8 −28 62 72 5.53 4.33
LINEAR DECREASE OF BOLD SIGNAL WITH STIMULUS REPETITIONS
Middle occipital gyrus 19 L −32 −92 26 40 5.46 4.29
Supramarginal gyrus 40 L −62 −48 32 37 4.79 3.92
N=12 (good subliminal encoders); statistical maps thresholded at p=0.005, k=0 in medial and anterior temporal lobe regions, all other regions p=0.001, k=20.
to a high level of abstraction (Patterson et al., 2007). Prefrontal
repetition enhancements were located in the medial and supe-
rior frontal gyrus (both BA 6), which have been implicated in
fluent semantic retrieval (Binder et al., 2009). There were also
two regions of repetition suppression, one in left middle occipital
gyrus and the other in left supramarginal gyrus likely associ-
ated with a facilitated visual analysis of words (Stoeckel et al.,
2009).
FACILITATED PROCESSING OF SEMANTIC RELATIONS IN ANALOGS
To assess neural correlates of unconscious analogy detection, we
contrasted neural activity of good subliminal encoders between the
processing of analogs and broken analogs (collapsed over Learn-
ing Intensity) (Table 3). Analogs versus broken analogs evoked
activity enhancements in the left perirhinal cortex. Large areas in
the prefrontal cortex exhibited reduced activity during the pro-
cessing of analogs versus broken analogs (Table 3). We assume
that memories of subliminal word pairs were reactivated through
the left perirhinal cortex. The perirhinal cortex has been sug-
gested to store within-domain associations such as word–word
associations (Mayes et al., 2007). The perirhinal cortex may have
triggered the reactivation of neocortical memory traces of word
pairs in the regions of prefrontal cortex that support semantic
analyses and analogical reasoning (Morrison et al., 2004; Bunge
et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006b, 2010). These prefrontal activa-
tions were smaller than activations in these same regions evoked
in response to broken analogs. The concerned regions were the
right middle and superior frontal gyrus (BA 10, 11) and the left
middle frontal gyrus (BA 9, 10). These ventromedial prefrontal
regions have been found to support the analogical mapping of
elements of a current with elements of a past episode (Green et al.,
2006b, 2010). Accordingly, unconscious memories of subliminal
word pairs in the left rhinal cortex may have facilitated the pro-
cessing of semantic relations between words in analogs by way of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Signal attenuations to analogs
versus broken analogs in more lateral prefrontal regions may have
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Table 3 | Retrieval of analogous semantic relations.
Brain region BA Left/right MNI-coordinates k t z
x y z
ANALOGS > BROKEN ANALOGS
Perirhinal cortex 35 L −18 −32 −14 8 3.02 2.94
BROKEN ANALOGS >ANALOGS
Middle frontal gyrus 10 R 26 56 14 32 3.58 3.45
Superior frontal gyrus 10 R 18 54 28 106 4.27 4.07
Middle frontal gyrus 11 R 24 46 −10 27 4.37 4.15
Medial frontal gyrus 8 L/R −2 40 46 70 3.94 3.78
Middle frontal gyrus 47 L −40 38 −4 25 3.67 3.54
Superior frontal gyrus 6 R 14 32 62 24 3.76 3.62
Middle frontal gyrus 9, 46 R 44 30 30 89 4.49 4.26
Middle frontal gyrus 9 L −34 28 22 106 4.5 4.27
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 L −48 14 20 62 3.81 3.66
Middle frontal gyrus 6 R 28 12 66 59 4.74 4.47
Middle temporal gyrus 22, 21 R 56 −40 4 236 5.7 5.27
Angular, supramarginal gyrus 39, 40 R 56 −64 36 52 3.87 3.72
N= 24 (good subliminal encoders); statistical maps were thresholded at p=0.005, k=0 in medial and anterior temporal lobe regions, all other regions p=0.001,
k=20.
facilitated the relational analysis of the two words in analogs (Blu-
menfeld and Ranganath, 2006; Murray and Ranganath, 2007).
Further signal attenuations in a more dorsal frontal region (BA
6) suggest that the semantic retrieval was facilitated for words in
analogs versus broken analogs (Binder et al., 2009). Other signal
attenuations were located in the right angular and supramarginal
gyri as well as the right middle and superior temporal gyri. These
regions may have facilitated the detection of semantic feature over-
lap between encoding words (e.g., table–car) and words in analogs
(e.g., desk–bus) (Patterson et al., 2007).
Finally, analogs elicited less activation than broken analogs in
regions supporting conflict monitoring. These conflict monitor-
ing regions concern posterior portions of the medial prefrontal
cortex (Ridderinkhof, 2004), namely the medial frontal gyrus (BA
8) and the middle frontal gyrus (BA 9). These regions in the pos-
terior medial prefrontal cortex may have contributed to the detec-
tion of the mismatch between broken analogs and corresponding
representations of encoding word pairs.
ENCODING ACTIVATION PREDICTS ANALOGY DETECTION
We correlated the good subliminal encoders’ single-trial encoding
contrasts (subliminal word pairs versus subliminal pairs of con-
sonant stings) with their behavioral performance on unconscious
analogy detection (difference in the percentage of fit responses
given to analogs versus broken analogs). Positive correlations
appeared in the right hippocampus (Figure 4, top), which con-
firms that the hippocampal encoding of subliminal word pairs
mediated analogy detection. Another cluster emerged in the
medial frontal gyrus (BA 8) suggesting that increased effort in
a region supporting semantic word analysis (Binder et al., 2009)
was predictive of better analogy detection at test. A further clus-
ter was located in the superior frontal gyrus (BA 11), which – as
noted earlier – has been implicated in the integration of distant
semantic concepts (Green et al., 2006b, 2010). A further cluster
was located in the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47), which has
been found to support the evaluation of relationships between
elements in a stimulus (Blumenfeld and Ranganath, 2006; Murray
and Ranganath, 2007).
Next, we computed correlations between the good subliminal
encoders’ activity increases over nine encoding trials and their
performance at test (Figure 4, bottom). A steeper linear activity
increase in the left perirhinal cortex predicted a larger number of
fit responses to analogs than broken analogs. This result substan-
tiates that the medial temporal lobe subserved the unconscious
formation of relational memories. Furthermore, a steeper signal
increase in the left temporal pole and the left inferior temporal
gyrus predicted a better test performance. This result corrobo-
rates that increased neural recruitment in lexical-semantic storage
sites during subliminal encoding aided later analogy detection.
Finally, a steeper signal increase in the middle cingulate gyrus (BA
24) predicted a better test performance.
BRAIN ACTIVATION AT TEST PREDICTS ANALOGY DETECTION
We correlated the good subliminal encoders’ activation differ-
ence to analogs versus broken analogs with their performance at
detecting analogies unconsciously (Figure 5). Positive correlations
emerged in the right and left hippocampus and the right thalamus.
The thalamus is a part of the episodic memory network (Winocur
et al., 1984; Aggleton et al., 2011; Pergola et al., 2012). Our thalamic
cluster lies in the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, which has
projections to the prefrontal cortex and the temporal lobe (Behrens
et al., 2003). Thus, the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus might
have mediated the interaction of medial temporal with prefrontal
regions. Negative correlations were located in the left perirhinal
cortex and the right middle temporal gyrus. Activity reductions
in perirhinal cortex track familiarity with a stimulus (Voss et al.,
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FIGURE 4 | Correlation of encoding-related brain activity with analogy
detection at test. The location of the cluster of voxels, where correlations
reached significance, is shown on anatomical brain images. BA, Brodmann
area; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; MFG, medial
frontal gyrus; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus. Scatter plots of these correlations
are presented below brain images. The first eigenvariate of the cluster of
significantly correlating activity is displayed in arbitrary units on the y -axis.
The difference in the percentage of fit responses to analogs versus broken
analogs is displayed on the x -axis. All data come from good subliminal
encoders (N =12). The top panel shows correlations of activity increases to
subliminal word pairs versus pairs of consonant strings during one-trial
encoding with analogy detection. The bottom panel shows correlations of
linear activity increases over the ninefold encoding of word pairs with
analogy detection.
2009) – in our case the familiarity with semantic relations in
analogs. Activity reductions in the middle temporal gyrus likely
reflect neural facilitation during the re-processing versus first-
time processing of semantic relations. Familiarity and facilitated
semantic processing might relate to enhanced analogy detection.
GOOD SUBLIMINAL ENCODERS EXHIBITED MORE ACTIVITY IN THE
MEDIAL TEMPORAL LOBE THAN POOR SUBLIMINAL ENCODERS
Comparisons between good and poor subliminal encoders under-
scored that the episodic memory network supported unconscious
memory formation and analogy detection (Table 4). A between-
group t -contrast of good versus poor subliminal encoders’ brain
activity during one-trial encoding of word pairs revealed two sig-
nificant left hippocampal clusters. This result indicates that good
encoders activated the hippocampus more strongly than poor sub-
liminal encoders in response to subliminal word pairs. Moreover, a
steeper increase of the BOLD signal to repeating subliminal word
pairs during nine-trial encoding was located in the left hippocam-
pus and bilateral rhinal cortex of good versus poor subliminal
encoders. Finally, good subliminal encoders activated the left hip-
pocampus and left parahippocampal gyrus to a greater extent than
poor subliminal encoders in response to analogs versus broken
analogs presented at test.
DISCUSSION
We report evidence for the unconscious detection of analogical
relations in a present and a past situation. Participants encoded
subliminal word pairs and later judged the semantic fit of new
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FIGURE 5 | Correlation of retrieval-related brain activity with
analogy detection at test. The location of the cluster of voxels, where
correlations reached significance, is shown on anatomical brain images.
BA, Brodmann area; MTG, middle temporal gyrus. Scatter plots of these
correlations are presented below brain images. The first eigenvariate of
the cluster of significantly correlating activity is displayed in arbitrary
units on the y -axis. The difference in the percentage of fit responses to
analogs versus broken analogs is displayed on the x -axis. All data come
from good subliminal encoders (N =24; data collapsed over Encoding
Intensity).
Table 4 | Comparisons between good and poor subliminal encoders.
Brain region BA Left/right MNI-coordinates k t z
x y z
GOOD > POOR SUBLIMINAL ENCODERS, ONE-TRIAL ENCODING (WORDS > NONWORDS)
Middle cingulate gyrus 23 R 6 −14 30 39 4.41 3.72
Hippocampus L −30 −40 2 35 4.6 3.83
Hippocampus L −38 −20 −16 56 4.16 3.56
GOOD > POOR SUBLIMINAL ENCODERS, NINE-TRIAL ENCODING (LINEAR INCREASE)
Postcentral gyrus 4 L −60 −18 46 29 5.44 4.28
Hippocampus, rhinal cortex L −30 −16 −24 13 3.42 3.03
Rhinal cortex R 26 −24 −20 23 3.64 3.19
INTERACTION OF RETRIEVAL CONDITION WITH SUBLIMINAL ENCODING QUALITY
(ANALOGS > BROKEN ANALOGS, GOOD > POOR SUBLIMINAL ENCODERS)
Parahippocampal gyrus L −20 −32 −16 51 3.9 3.74
Hippocampus L −40 −32 −4 19 3.26 3.17
N= 51; statistical maps thresholded at p=0.005, k=0 in medial and anterior temporal lobe regions, all other regions p=0.001, k=20.
words in supraliminal pairs that either retained a previously
encoded semantic relation (analogs) or not (broken analogs). The
successful unconscious detection of semantic relations in supral-
iminal test words that were analogous to semantic relations in
subliminal encoding words was suggested by a larger number of
fit responses given to analogs than broken analogs at test. Hence,
episodically related versus unrelated words in test pairs were more
often judged as closely related semantically. In other words, seman-
tic relations encoded in an unconsciously experienced episode
had intruded into judgments of semantic distance made at test.
This effect corresponds to findings from supraliminal, i.e., con-
scious, stimulus processing. When two unrelated words, which
had been presented in the same encoding context and were there-
fore episodically (but not semantically) related, were represented
at test, they appeared closer semantically than words that had not
been presented in the same encoding context; or they appeared
equally close as words that were related semantically (McKoon and
Ratcliff, 1979, 1986; Dosher and Rosedale, 1991; Patterson et al.,
2009; Coane and Balota, 2011). This line of research suggests that
connections between mental representations or between nodes in
the semantic network, which have been co-activated in the same
encoding context, acquire a greater linkage strength leading to the
impression of stronger conceptual relatedness. The co-occurrence
of concepts in naturalistic events is indeed one way how the
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semantic system may be dynamically (re)organized throughout
life (Coane and Balota, 2011). Although test pairs in the current
study did not contain the subliminal encoding words but semantic
neighbors thereof, the same principle seems to apply.
These modifications in the semantic system apparently relied
on the relational binding of subliminal words in the hippocampus.
The hippocampus is thought to assist the encoding of events by
association formation between simultaneously activated areas of
the neocortex (Teyler and DiScenna, 1986; Treves and Rolls, 1994).
Because our task required a rapid relational encoding process
with resulting flexible representations of word pairs (Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010), we had hypothesized a role for
the hippocampus in relational encoding and retrieval. Our neu-
roimaging results confirmed the expected involvement of the hip-
pocampus and other structures of the episodic memory network
during subliminal encoding and during unconscious retrieval in
the test situation.
The current results emphasize the intimate relationship
between memory and analogical reasoning. While previous neu-
roimaging studies of analogical reasoning made use of pre-existing
knowledge stored in semantic memory that acted as source knowl-
edge (Bunge et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006b, 2010), we aimed at
the unconscious detection of analogies to episodic rather than
semantic memories. Therefore, we had participants establish new
episodic source knowledge in the experimental session. Due to
our particular interest in unconscious analogical reasoning, we
excluded conscious awareness already at the time of encoding the
source episodes. Our finding of a successful unconscious detec-
tion of analogies between current and past episodes connects with
purely behavioral studies of unconscious analogical reasoning, in
which participants also encoded source information – although
supraliminal source information – in the experimental session
itself (Schunn and Dunbar, 1996; Day and Gentner, 2007; Day and
Goldstone, 2011). The source knowledge gained in these studies
was of a procedural (Day and Goldstone, 2011) or episodic nature
(Schunn and Dunbar, 1996; Day and Gentner, 2007). Because
all encoding material was presented suprathreshold for conscious
inspection, information about conscious awareness of insight into
analogies had to be determined with post-experimental question-
naires. This procedure is liberal because a potential conscious
detection of analogies of a current with a past (conscious) learning
situation may remain unreported. The subliminal presentation of
the source information excludes consciousness of analogy detec-
tion more rigorously. That the presentation of encoding word
pairs was indeed subliminal was demonstrated in our study by the
participants’ chance performance on the direct test of awareness
(Greenwald et al., 1996; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006).
In line with studies of conscious analogical reasoning (Bunge
et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006b, 2010; Speed, 2010; Knowlton
et al., 2012), the largest signal change during unconscious anal-
ogy detection (analogs versus broken analogs) was located in the
medial prefrontal cortex. Ventromedial (BA 10, 11) prefrontal
areas are thought to promote the integration of distant seman-
tic concepts as a means to achieve analogical mapping (Bunge
et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006b, 2010). Perceived semantic dis-
tance is likely represented in medial prefrontal cortex because
ventromedial prefrontal activity scaled positively with the seman-
tic distance between two words in a pair, as reported in a study
of conscious analogical reasoning (Green et al., 2010). In the
present study, ventromedial prefrontal activity was reduced in
response to analogs versus broken analogs, which corresponds to
the subjective decrease in semantic distance of words in analogs
versus broken analogs (see also Reber and Henke, 2011). At the
intersection of memory and decision making, the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex brings together the contents of long-term
memory provided by the hippocampus and the planning abili-
ties of prefrontal cortex to guide behavior (Euston et al., 2012;
Guitart-Masip et al., 2013). We assume that the display of analogs
in the test situation had triggered the reactivation of uncon-
scious memories of subliminal word pairs through the medial
temporal lobe, which in turn evoked a reinstatement of activ-
ity within the medial prefrontal cortex and other neocortical
regions (McClelland et al., 1995). This reinstatement may have
facilitated the processing of semantic relations between words in
analogs.
The current findings show that the medial temporal lobe
including hippocampus mediated unconscious relational encod-
ing and the flexible retrieval of stored relations in the test situation,
which enabled the unconscious detection of analogous relation-
ships. Because the study format (e.g., table–car) differed from the
test format (e.g., desk–bus), relational memories must have been
expressed flexibly in the test situation. Hence, our data suggest
that the encoding of new semantic relations and their flexible
expression do not depend on conscious awareness of encoding
and retrieval. This finding supports our notion that hippocampus-
dependent relational encoding and retrieval may proceed with
and without conscious awareness of encoding/retrieval (Henke,
2010) and questions views that link hippocampal processing and
episodic memory to consciousness (Tulving, 1985; Reber and
Squire, 1994; Squire and Zola, 1996; Squire et al., 2007; Moscov-
itch, 2008). The current and past findings of unconscious rela-
tional encoding (Henke et al., 2003a,b; Degonda et al., 2005;
Duss et al., 2011; Reber and Henke, 2011, 2012; Reber et al.,
2012) and past findings of unconscious relational retrieval (e.g.,
Greene et al., 2001; Leo and Greene,2008; Hannula and Ranganath,
2009) are better accommodated by a memory model that divides
between memory systems based on processing modes rather than
consciousness (Henke, 2010).
Beyond memory, our results highlight the extent to which
purely unconscious processes may contribute to higher-order
cognition. Our study adds to a growing body of literature that
pushes the boundaries of unconscious cognition into fields such
as cognitive control (Van Gaal et al., 2008, 2010), decision making
(Pessiglione et al., 2007, 2008), and free will (Soon et al., 2008).
It becomes increasingly clear that our behavior and our conscious
thoughts are deeply influenced by unconscious processes.
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